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Kripke Semantics for a Logical Framework
Alex K. Simpson

Department of Computer Science, University of Edinburgh,
JCMB, The King's Buildings, Edinburgh, EH9 3JZ.
Alex.Simpson@dcs.ed.ac.uk
Abstract
We present a semantics (using Kripke lambda models) for a logical framework
(minimal implicational predicate logic with quantication over all higher types).
We apply the semantics to obtain straightforward adequacy proofs for encodings of
logics in the framework.
1 Introduction
There has been much recent interest in the development and use of logical frameworks.
A logical framework is a formal system within which many dierent logics can be easily
represented. It is hoped that such frameworks will facilitate the rapid development of
proof assistants for the wide variety of dierent logics used in computer science and other
elds. In this paper we give a semantic analysis (using Kripke lambda models) of the use
of minimal implicational predicate logic (with quantication over all higher types) as a
logical framework. We choose this framework because it is relatively straightforward to
give it a useful semantics.
The use of such a logic as a framework is not new. Similar logics have been used
for this purpose by Paulson [17] and Felty and Miller [5]. Also, the earlier Edinburgh
Logical Framework (LF) of Harper, Honsell and Plotkin [9], although a dependently-
typed lambda-calculus, is closely related to minimal implicational predicate logic by the
Curry-Howard correspondence between propositions and types.
There are two main ingredients to the encoding of a logic in a framework: the rep-
resentation of syntax and the representation of logical consequence. In our framework,
syntax is encoded by terms of the simply-typed lambda calculus. The encoding of syntax
in such a way is, in general, straightforward and of little theoretical interest. We shall
therefore simplify matters by giving as few details as possible and abusing notation as

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much as possible. One might prefer to assume that the syntax of the logic being encoded
is already given in the typed lambda calculus (as advocated by Martin-Lof [16], Pfenning
and Elliot [18] and others).
The consequence relation of a logic is represented through an axiomatization of its
properties in the framework. The desired connection is one of the following form:

1
; : : : ; 
n
`
L
 i A; true(

1
); : : : ; true(

n
) `
F
true(

);
where `
L
is the consequence relation of the encoded logic, `
F
is the consequence relation
of the framework, A is the axiomatization, true is a predicate in the framework and ()

is the mapping from formulae in the encoded logic to their representing terms in the
framework. An axiomatization satisfying the above equivalence is said to be adequate.
To encode a logic in a framework one must provide an axiomatization and prove its
adequacy. The left-to-right implication of adequacy (which we call fullness) is usually
quite easy to prove. One takes some proof system for the encoded logic and shows
that each proof can be mimicked by one in the framework. The right-to-left implication
(which we call faithfulness) is trickier. To show it proof-theoretically one must show
that any derivation in the framework is (essentially) the representation of a derivation in
some proof system for the encoded logic. This is usually done by an analysis of normal
forms for derivations in the framework, which can be quite involved (see, e.g., Harper et
al [9] and Paulson [17]).
The goal of this paper is to show how faithfulness can be easily established semantic-
ally. Intuitively, faithfulness should not be a dicult property to demonstrate. The
encoding of logical consequence amounts to a meta-axiomatization of its properties.
Faithfulness should follow from the \truth" of the meta-axioms. However, it is not
always clear how to read a meta-axiom. For example, the meta-axiom:
8 :o: 8 :o: (true()  true( ))  true()  )
(here o is the type of sentences of the encoded logic, ) is implication in the encoded
logic and  is implication in the framework) could be understood as expressing that the
\Deduction Theorem" holds for the encoded logic; alternatively it might be interpreted
\classically" as:
8 :o: 8 :o: (true()^ :true( ))_ true()  ):
In order to understand such statements unambiguously, we need a model of the frame-
work to interpret them in.
In this paper we provide a notion of model for the framework (using the Kripke
lambda models of Mitchell and Moggi [15]). Faithfulness is then proved by constructing
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particular models of an encoding within which the truth (or soundness) of the meta-
axiomatization can be veried.
A by-product of this approach to proving faithfulness is that the models we con-
struct give an interpretation to the meta-logic of the framework. We shall consider two
dierent sorts of model: term models constructed (essentially) from the syntax of the
encoded logic, and \semantic" models built out of models of the encoded logic. Both
kinds of model enable formulae of the framework to be understood as expressing meta-
propositions about the encoded logic. Although we do not systematically consider the
dierent meta-interpretations induced by dierent models, it is important to note that
the model theory allows a meta-formula to be given a formal meaning substantiating its
informal reading.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present the framework we
use. Then in Section 3 we give some example encodings of logics in the framework. The
semantics of the framework is given in section 4. This is used in Section 5 to prove the
faithfulness of the encodings presented in Section 3. In Section 6 we begin to build a
general theory relating properties of encodings (such as faithfulness) with their semantic
counterparts. Finally, in section 7 we conclude with a discussion of related work and
possible directions for future research.
2 The framework
The framework we use is minimal implicational predicate logic with universal quantica-
tion over all higher types. It is very similar to the logic programming language considered
by Miller in [13]. It is also closely related to the frameworks considered by Paulson [17]
and Felty and Miller [5] (the main dierences are to do with the treatment of predicates
outwith the type system and, in the case of Paulson's work, our restriction to predicative
quantication).
We use A, B and C to range over (simple) types, M and N to range over terms (of
the simply-typed -calculus), and  and 	 to range over formulae (lower case Greek
letters will be reserved for formulae of the encoded logics).
We assume given four countably innite, disjoint sets: a set of type constants, a set
of predicate symbols, a set of term constants and a set of variables. We use P; : : : to range
over the predicate symbols, c; : : : to range over the term constants and x; : : : to range
over the variables.
A theory is generated by a presentation which is a quadruple, (T ;P ;;A), where
each of T , P ,  and A are sets as specied below. Mostly (but not exclusively) we
consider nite presentations, i.e. those in which all four sets are nite.
T is a subset of the set of type constants. Types are generated from this set by the
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grammar:
A ::=  j A! B
where  ranges over elements of T . As usual, when brackets are omitted, \!" associates
to the right. (We shall also adopt this convention with implication connectives, both in
the framework and in the encoded logics.) P is a set of predicate declarations of the form
P : hA
1
; : : : ; A
n
i (where n is possibly zero) such that each predicate symbol, P , appears
only once in the set.  is a set of constant declarations of the form c :A such that each
term constant, c, appears only once in the set. The requirements on A are given below.
Henceforth everything will be parameterized over T and P and these sets will usually
be left implicit. Thus we often refer to the presentation as (;A).
A context, ?, is a nite set of variable declarations of the form x :A such that each
variable, x, appears only once in the set. The abstract syntax of terms and formulae is
given by the following grammar.
M ::= c j x j x :A:M jM(N)
 ::= P (M
1
; : : : ;M
n
) j   	 j 8x :A: 
We write N [M=x] and [M=x] for the substitution of M for all free occurrences of x in
N and  respectively. Lambda-terms and quantied formulae are considered identied
up to -equivalence.
The term calculus is just the simply-typed lambda calculus (for which a good refer-
ence is [14]). We write ? 

M :A to mean thatM is term over  with type A in context
?. We shall only be concerned with -equality, =

, between terms. We note (but shall
not use) that equality between terms is decidable. A term, M , such that ? 

M :A is
said to be in long- normal form (with respect to ? and ) if it has the form:
x
1
:A
1
: : : :x
n
:A
n
: h(M
1
) : : :(M
m
)
where: n;m  0; h is either a variable or a constant; ?; x
1
: A
1
; : : : ; x
n
: A
n


h(M
1
) : : :(M
m
) :  for some type constant ; and each M
i
(1  i  m) is in long-
 normal form with respect to ?; x
1
:A
1
; : : : ; x
n
:A
n
and . Clearly any M in long-
normal form with respect to ? and  is also in long- normal form with respect to
?
0
 ? and 
0
 . The crucial property of long- normal forms is the following (see
[12]): if ? 

M :A then there is a unique term, (M), in long- normal form (with
respect to ? and ) such that M =

(M).
In Figure 1 we give a formal system for deriving judgements of the form ? 

 prop.
When ? 

 prop is derivable we say that  is well-formed in ? and . When ? is
the empty set it is omitted from such statements.  will be omitted when it can be
understood from the context.
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? 

M
1
:A
1
: : : ? 

M
n
:A
n
P :hA
1
; : : : ; A
n
i 2 P
? 

P (M
1
; : : : ;M
n
) prop
? 

 prop ? 

	 prop ?; x :A 

 prop
? 

  	 prop ? 

8x :A:  prop
Figure 1: Well-formedness rules for formulae.
Ax  2 A Ass  2 H
?;H `
(;A)
 ?;H `
(;A)

Sub ?;H `
(;A)
[M=x] M =

N ? 

[N=x] prop
?;H `
(;A)
[N=x]
 I ?;H; `
(;A)
	  E ?;H `
(;A)
  	 ?;H `
(;A)

?;H `
(;A)
  	 ?;H `
(;A)
	
8I ?; x :A;H `
(;A)
 8E ?;H `
(;A)
8x :A:  ? 

M :A
?;H `
(;A)
8x :A:  ?;H `
(;A)
[M=x]
Restriction on 8I: x does not occur free in H.
Figure 2: Rules for meta-logical consequence.
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The fourth component of the presentation, A, is a set of formulae, the axioms, such
that each formula in A is well-formed in .
Logical consequence for (;A):
?;H `
(;A)

relates ?, H and  where H is a set of formulae, the hypotheses, and each formula in
H [ fg is well-formed in ? and . This relation is given by the formal system of
Figure 2.
In the sequel we shall require the following elementary derived result about con-
sequence.
Lemma 2.1 (Weakening) If ?;H `
(;A)
 and all formulae in H
0
are well-formed in
? [ ?
0
then ?;?
0
;H;H
0
`
(;A)
.
The easy proof, by induction on the structure of derivations, is omitted.
3 Encoding logics in the framework
In this section we give some example encodings illustrating the use of the framework.
These encodings will later serve as examples for demonstrating our semantic approach to
proving adequacy. Many other examples (in the context of LF) which we could equally
well have chosen are detailed in [3].
The rst example is a very simple encoding of the implicational fragment of minimal
propositional logic. We use ,  , : : : to range over the formulae of the language, which
are given by the grammar:
 ::= a
i
j )  
where fa
i
g is a countable set of propositional constants indexed by natural numbers i.
The consequence relation of the logic, `
m
, is just the restriction of intuitionistic con-
sequence to the fragment. The standard Hilbert-style axiomatization of the consequence
relation is well known (see, e.g., Hindley and Seldin [11, p. 193]).
The presentation encoding minimal implicational logic is (T
m
;P
m
;
m
;A
m
) of Fig-
ure 3. There are two type constants: a type of natural numbers, N , and a type of
formulae, o. It is easy to show that the long- normal forms (in the empty context) of
N are just the numerals (terms of the form s
n
(0)). The constructor a : N ! o produces
a new propositional constant a
i
for every numeral i. It is again easy to show that the
long- normal forms of type o are in one-to-one correspondence with the formulae of
the logic. We do not formalize this correspondence as it is completely routine. Further
6
Tm
= fN; og
P
m
= ftrue :hoig

m
= f0 : N; s : N ! N; a : N ! o; ): o! o! og
A
m
= f8p :o: 8q :o: true(p) q ) p);
8p :o: 8q :o: 8r :o: true((p) q ) r)) (p) q)) p) r);
8p :o: 8q :o: true(p) q)  true(p)  true(q)g
Figure 3: Presentation of propositional minimal implicational logic.
T
T
= f; og
P
T
= ftrue :hoig

T
= f): o! o! o; : : o! o; 8 : (! o)! o; = : ! ! o;
P
a
1
1
:
a
1
times
z }| {
! : : : ! o; : : : ; P
a
h
h
:
a
h
times
z }| {
! : : :  ! o;
f
a
0
1
1
:
a
0
1
times
z }| {
! : : : ! ; : : : ; f
a
0
k
k
:
a
0
k
times
z }| {
! : : :  ! g
A
T
= f8p :o: 8q :o: (true(p)  true(q))  true(p) q);
8p :o: 8q :o: true(p) q)  (true(p)  true(q));
8p :o: 8q :o: true(p)  true(:p)  true(q);
8p :o: 8q :o: (true(p)  true(q))  (true(:p)  true(q))  true(q);
8p : ! o: (8x : : true(p(x)))  true(8x: p(x));
8p : ! o: true(8x: p(x)) (8x : : true(p(x)));
8x : : true(x = x);
8p : ! o: 8x : : 8y : : true(x = y)  true(p(x)) true(p(y));
true(T
1
); : : : ; true(T
l
)g
Figure 4: Presentation of an arbitrary classical rst-order theory.
7
we take the liberty (for the sake of notational convenience) of identifying long- normal
forms of type o with their corresponding formulae.
We now turn to the axiomatization of consequence given by A
m
. Its correctness is
summed up by:
Proposition 3.1 (Adequacy for minimal logic) The following are equivalent:
1. 
1
; : : : ; 
n
`
m
.
2. true(
1
); : : : ; true(
n
) `
(
m
;A
m
)
true().
We call the property that statement 1 implies statement 2 fullness and its converse
faithfulness. The fullness of the encoding is rather straightforward to establish. The
axioms in A
m
follow closely the standard Hilbert-style axiomatization of minimal logic.
The rst two of our axioms give the usual axiom schemas for minimal logic, and the
last of our axioms corresponds to the modus ponens rule. Accordingly, it is easy to show
that any derivation of  from 
1
, : : :, 
n
in the Hilbert system can be mimicked by a
derivation of true(
1
); : : : ; true(
n
) `
(
m
;A
m
)
true() in the framework. The details are
entirely routine. Thus the encoding is indeed full.
The faithfulness of the encoding could also be established by proof-theoretical means.
To do so would require a normal-form result for the framework (see the discussion in
Section 1). However, it is intuitively obvious that the encoding is faithful. All the meta-
axioms in the presentation are true with respect to their evident interpretation. To
formalize such an argument we must build a model of the whole framework extending
the evident interpretation to arbitrary types. We shall give a rigorous proof along these
lines in Section 5.
Our second example is an arbitrary nitely axiomatized theory in classical rst-order
logic. Suppose we have a nite rst-order signature consisting of predicate symbols
fP
a
1
1
; : : : ; P
a
h
h
g (where a
i
is the arity of P
i
) and function symbols ff
a
0
1
1
; : : : ; f
a
0
k
k
g. We
now use ,  , : : : to range over formulae in the resulting rst-order language. (For
simplicity, we consider just the connectives for negation and implication and the universal
quantier.) Let T = fT
1
; : : : ; T
l
g be a nite set of sentences in this language. We consider
the consequence relation, `
T
, between rst-order formulae dened by 
1
; : : : ; 
n
`
T

if and only if there is a natural deduction derivation (in Prawitz' system for classical
natural deduction [19]) of  from the axioms in T in which all open assumptions are
contained in the set f
1
; : : : ; 
n
g. This is the so-called \truth" consequence relation
of rst-order logic (see Avron [2]). An alternative, semantic, characterization of the
consequence relation is that 
1
; : : : ; 
n
`
T
 holds if and only if, for all rst-order models
M of T and all environments  mapping variables to elements of the domain of M, if
8
M j=


1
and : : : and M j=


n
then M j=

 (the reader is referred to [23] for the
denition of classical satisfaction). We shall use this characterization later.
The encoding of the rst-order theory is given by the presentation (T
T
;P
T
;
T
;A
T
)
in Figure 4. Given a nite set of rst-order variables, X , we write X :  for the context
fx :  j x 2 Xg. The set of rst-order terms with all variables in X is in one-to-one
correspondence with the set of framework terms of type  in long- normal form with
respect to X : . Similarly, the set of rst-order formulae with all free variables in X is in
one-to-one correspondence with the set of long- normal forms of type o with respect to
X : . Again, these correspondences are straightforward to establish, so we omit details
and henceforth identify framework terms in long- form with their associated rst-order
terms and formulae. For example, we write 8x:  for the framework term 8(x : : ).
Such conventions are used freely in the axiomatization of consequence.
Proposition 3.2 (Adequacy for rst-order logic) Let X be a non-empty nite set
of variables containing all free variables in 
1
; : : : ; 
n
; . Then the following are equival-
ent:
1. 
1
; : : : ; 
n
`
T
.
2. X : ; true(
1
); : : : ; true(
n
) `
(
T
;A
T
)
true().
Once again, fullness is easy to establish. The axiomatization is designed to easily mimic
the standard natural deduction rules for rst-order classical logic. The only interesting
point is the requirement that X be non-empty even when 
1
; : : : ; 
n
;  are closed. The
reason is that the assumption that the type  is non-empty is not built into the framework,
whereas the assumption that the domain of quantication is non-empty is (rightly or
wrongly) built into rst-order logic. (However, if the rst-order signature contains a
constant then the assumption that X is non-empty is no longer required.) A detailed
proof of fullness is given by Harper et al [9] for a closely related encoding in the context of
LF. They also prove the faithfulness of their encoding using a normal-form result for LF.
Again, we shall show in Section 5 that a straightforward semantic proof of faithfulness
is possible.
For our last example, we present an an encoding of the minimal normal modal logic
K. We now use ,  , : : : to range over formulae given by the grammar:
 ::= a
i
j )  j : j 2
We consider the \truth" consequence relation, `
K
, for the logic (again see Avron [2]).
A simple semantic characterization of the consequence relation can be given in terms of
Kripke models (W;R; j=) where: W is a set (of \worlds"); R is a binary relation on W
(the \visibility" relation); and j= is a binary (\satisfaction") relation between worlds and
9
TK
= fN; o;Wg
P
K
= fR :hW;W i; sat :hW; oig

K
= f0 : N; s : N ! N; a : N ! o; ) : o! o! o; : : o! o; 2 : o! og
A
K
= f8x :W: 8p :o: 8q :o: (sat(x; p) sat(x; q)) sat(x; p) q);
8x :W: 8p :o: 8q :o: sat(x; p) q)  (sat(x; p) sat(x; q));
8x :W: 8p :o: 8q :o: sat(x; p) sat(x;:p) sat(x; q);
8x :W: 8p :o: 8q :o: (sat(x; p) sat(x; q)) (sat(x;:p) sat(x; q)) sat(x; q);
8x :W: 8p :o: (8y :W: R(x; y)  sat(y; p))  sat(x;2p);
8x :W: 8p :o: sat(x;2p) 8y :W: R(x; y)  sat(y; p)g
Figure 5: Presentation of the modal logic K.
formulae satisfying well-known inductive properties (see [4]). The consequence relation
is dened by: 
1
; : : : ; 
n
`
K
 if and only if, for all models (W;R; j=), for all w 2 W , if
w j= 
1
and : : : and w j= 
n
then w j= .
The encoding is given by the presentation (T
K
;P
K
;
K
;A
K
) of Figure 5. As with
minimal logic, we have a type N of natural numbers (to generate propositional con-
stants) and a type o of formulae. Again, the formulae of modal logic are in one-to-one
correspondence with the terms of type o in long- form with respect to the empty
context and we identify such terms with their associated formulae. However, this time
we have another type, W , intended to stand for the set of worlds in a model. Similarly
R and sat are intended to represent the visibility and satisfaction relations respectively.
So the axiomatization of consequence is most easily understood semantically. However,
it can also be seen as representing (a variant of) the Fitch-style natural deduction proof
system for K, see Fitting's book [6, Chapter 4, Sections 12, 15 and 16]. It is also closely
related to Fitting's prexed tableau systems [6, Chapter 8]. It is possible to give other
presentations of K based on, for example, its standard Hilbert-style proof system (see
Avron's encoding of S4 in LF [3]). However, we believe that our semantic-based encoding
is rather natural. It will also serve to illustrate nicely the semantic approach to proving
faithfulness.
Proposition 3.3 (Adequacy for K) The following are equivalent:
 
1
; : : : ; 
n
` .
 x :W ; sat(x; 
1
); : : : ; sat(x; 
n
) `
(
K
;A
K
)
sat(x; ).
10
Once again, fullness is routine. Although the encoding is not based on any proof system,
it is very easy to show that the standard Hilbert system for K can be mimicked within
it. Other than the routine verication of the axioms of classical propositional logic, it
suces to show that the system derives the characteristic axiom of K and is closed under
necessitation (restricted to theorems). For the characteristic axiom we must show that,
for any ,  :
x :W ; `
(
K
;A
K
)
sat(x;2()  )) 2) 2 ):
This is a straightforward, but worthwhile, exercise. For necessitation, we must show
that if x :W ; `
(
K
;A
K
)
sat(x; ) then x :W ; `
(
K
;A
K
)
sat(x;2). But this is an easy
consequence of the \2-introduction" axiom.
Again, the faithfulness of the encoding is more interesting. One possible way to
obtain a syntactic proof is as follows. First, dene a natural deduction proof system for
K based on the proof system adumbrated in the encoding. Then, using a normal form
result for the framework, show that every framework derivation does indeed correspond
to a derivation in the new system. Lastly, justify the correctness of the new proof system
by proving it sound with respect to the semantics of K.
1
Fortunately, the middle ground
can be cut out completely. Rather than providing a new proof system, it is possible
to justify the soundness of the framework encoding directly. Full details are given in
Section 5.
4 Semantics
As the meta-logic is intuitionistic with quantication over all higher types, we seek a
semantics in terms of Kripke models in which all typed lambda terms can be interpreted
at each world. The Kripke lambda models of Mitchell and Moggi [15] are thus a natural
choice. This section is rather technical. For a more discursive presentation of Kripke
lambda models the reader is urged to consult [15]. However, although we follow their
paper quite closely, the reader is advised that some of our notation and terminology
diers from that of Mitchell and Moggi.
An (extensional, Kripke, T -P-)prestructure is a sextuple:
(W;; f[A]]
w
g; f[[P ]]
w
g; f
AB
w
g; fi
A
ww
0g)
where:
 W is a set of worlds partially ordered by .
1
Avron's proof of faithfulness for his twin judgement encodings of modal logic in LF proceeded in
this way [1].
11
 f[[A]]
w
g is a family of sets, [[A]]
w
, indexed by types, A, and worlds, w.
 f[[P ]]
w
g is a family of relations, [[P ]]
w
 [[A
1
]]
w
 : : : [[A
n
]]
w
, indexed by predicate
symbols, P , with declarations, P :hA
1
; : : : ; A
n
i, in P and worlds, w.
 f
AB
w
g is a family of functions, 
AB
w
: [[A! B]]
w
 [[A]]
w
 ! [[B]]
w
, indexed by pairs
of types, A, B, and worlds, w.
 fi
A
ww
0g is a family of functions, i
A
ww
0 : [[A]]
w
! [[A]]
w
0, indexed by types, A, and pairs
of worlds, w  w
0
.
subject to the conditions given below. In these (and henceforth) we adopt the following
notational conventions. When f 2 [[A! B]]
w
and a 2 [[A]]
w
, we write f(a) for 
AB
w
(f; a).
When a
w
2 [[A]]
w
and w  w
0
, we write a
w
0 for i
A
ww
0(a
w
).
The conditions are:
identity: For all worlds w, i
A
ww
is the identity.
composition: For all w  w
0
 w
00
, i
A
w
0
w
00  i
A
ww
0 = i
A
ww
00 .
naturality: For all w  w
0
, i
B
ww
0  
AB
w
= 
AB
w
0  (i
A!B
ww
0  i
A
ww
0).
extensionality: If f
w
; g
w
2 [[A ! B]]
w
and, for all w
0
 w, for all a 2 [[A]]
w
0, f
w
0(a) =
g
w
0(a) then f
w
= g
w
.
persistency: If [[P ]]
w
(a
1w
; : : : ; a
nw
) then, for all w
0
 w, [[P ]]
w
0(a
1w
0; : : : ; a
nw
0).
Thus a prestructure is an \extensional Kripke applicative structure" in the terminology
of [15], together with an extra parameter, f[[P ]]
w
g, used for interpreting the predicates
of the logic.
A partial element, p, of type A in a prestructure is given by an upper-closed subset
dom(p) W , its domain, and a family of elements, fp
w
g, indexed by worlds w 2 dom(p)
such that for all w
0
 w 2 dom(p), p
w
2 [[A]]
w
and i
A
ww
0(p
w
) = p
w
0 . Given p
w
2 [[A]]
w
, we
write p for the induced partial element of type A with domain fw
0
j w  w
0
g given by the
elements p
w
0 2 [[A]]
w
0. A global element is a partial element, p, for which dom(p) = W .
A -structure is a 9-tuple:
(W;; f[[A]
w
g; f[[P ]]
w
g; f[[c]]
w
g; f
A
1
A
2
w
g; fi
A
ww
0g; fK
AB
w
g; fS
ABC
w
g)
given by a prestructure together with f[[c]]
w
g, fK
AB
w
g and fS
ABC
w
g where:
 f[[c]]
w
g is a family of global elements, [[c]], of type A indexed by constants, c, with
declarations, c :A, in .
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 K
AB
is a global element of type A ! B ! A such that, for all worlds w, for all
a 2 [[A]]
w
, for all b 2 [[B]]
w
, K
AB
w
(a)(b) = a.
 S
ABC
is a global element of type (A! B ! C)! (A! B)! A! C such that,
for all worlds w, for all f 2 [[A! B ! C]]
w
, for all g 2 [[A! B]]
w
, for all a 2 [[A]]
w
,
S
ABC
w
(f)(g)(a) = f(a)(g(a)).
Henceforth we refer to a -structure as (W;) leaving the other components implicit.
An environment, , is a function from variables to partial elements. We say that
 interprets ? at w if, for all x : A 2 ?, (x) is a partial element of type A with
w 2 dom((x)). Clearly if  interprets ? at w and w
0
 w then  interprets ? at w
0
too.
Also any environment interprets the empty context at any world. Given an environment
 and an element a
w
2 [[A]]
w
we write [x := a] for the environment that agrees with
 on variables other than x and which assigns the induced partial element a to x. If 
interprets ? at w and a
w
2 [[A]]
w
then clearly [x := a] interprets ?; x :A at w.
IfM has type A in ?, and  interprets ? at w, then the interpretation, [[M ]]

w
2 [[A]]
w
,
of M by  at w is dened inductively on the structure of M by:
[[c]]

w
= [[c]]
w
[[x]]

w
= (x)
w
[[x :A:M ]]

w
= the unique f
w
2 [[A! B]]
w
(where A! B is the type of
x :A:M in ?) such that, for all w
0
 w, for all a
w
0 2 [[A]]
w
0 ,
f
w
0(a
w
0) = [[M ]]
[x:=a]
w
0
[[M(N)]]

w
= [[M ]]

w
([[N ]]

w
)
As in [15], the existence of the f
w
required in the x : A: M clause is given by the S
and K combinators, and its uniqueness is guaranteed by extensionality. Clearly if M is
well-typed in the empty context then the value of [[M ]]

w
is independent of , so we just
write [[M ]]
w
.
We now give some lemmas concerning the interpretation of terms in -structures.
Lemma 4.1 If ? 

M :A,  interprets ? at w and w  w
0
, then i
A
ww
0([[M ]]

w
) = [[M ]]

w
0
.
Lemma 4.2 If ?; x :A 

M :B, ? 

N :A and  interprets ? at w, then [[M [N=x]]]

w
=
[[M ]]
[x:=[[N ]

]
w
.
Lemma 4.3 If ? 

M : A, ? 

N : A, M =

N , and  interprets ? at w, then
[[M ]]

w
= [[N ]]

w
.
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The rst two lemmas are proved by straightforward inductions on the structure of M .
The third is proved by an induction on derivations (in the usual formal system for -
equality) of M =

N , using Lemma 4.2 in the verication -equality.
If  is well-formed in ?, and  interprets ? at w, then the \forcing" relation w j=


is dened inductively on the structure of  by:
w j=

P (M
1
; : : : ;M
n
) i [[P ]]
w
([[M
1
]]

w
; : : : ; [[M
n
]]

w
)
w j=

  	 i for all w
0
 w, if w
0
j=

 then w
0
j=

	
w j=

8x :A:  i for all w
0
 w, for all a
w
0 2 [[A]]
w
0, w
0
j=
[x:=a]

If H is a set of formulae, each well-formed in ?, and  interprets ? at w then we write
w j=

H to mean that w j=

, for all  2 H. If  is well-formed in the empty context
then whether w j=

 holds or not is independent of , so we write w j= . We write
(W;) j=  to mean, for all w 2 W , w j= .
The lemmas below give basic properties of the forcing relation.
Lemma 4.4 If w j=

 and w  w
0
then w
0
j=

.
Lemma 4.5 If ? 

M :A and  interprets ? at w, then w j=

[M=x] if and only if
w j=
[x:=[[M ]

]
.
Both these lemmas are proved by induction on the structure of . The base case of the
rst uses Lemma 4.1 together with the persistency property of the structure. The base
case of the second uses Lemma 4.2.
A (;A)-model is a -structure, (W;), such that, for all  2 A, (W;) j= .
Theorem 4.6 (Soundness and completeness) The two statements below are equi-
valent.
1. ?;H `
(;A)
.
2. For all (;A)-models (W;), for all w 2 W , for all  interpreting ? at w, if
w j=

H then w j=

.
Soundness is proved by a straightforward induction on the derivation of ?;H `
(;A)
.
The verication of the 8E rule uses Lemma 4.5. The verication of the Sub rule uses
Lemmas 4.3 and 4.5. Completeness is proved by a term model construction similar to
that used in [15] but interpreting the logic as well. Rather than directly constructing the
term model required for completeness, we give instead a general term model construction
of which the desired model will be a special case. The general construction will also be
used in Section 5 for the faithfulness proofs.
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The idea behind the term model construction is to build a -structure out of those
terms well-typed in a limited number of contexts. One extreme will be when only closed
terms are allowed. Such a model will be used in Section 5. The other extreme arises when
terms typable in arbitrary contexts are allowed. In this case we obtain the model used
to prove completeness. In Section 5 we shall also have use for a model lying somewhere
between the two extremes. Some open terms will be allowed, but only those typable in
specic contexts.
However, placing restrictions on the free variables allowed in terms raises the problem
of how to obtain an extensional model. This problem already occurs with classical Henkin
models of simply-typed lambda calculus. In general an equivalence relation must be
placed on terms to obtain the extensional collapse of the underlying (non-extensional)
applicative structure [14, p. 421].
To motivate the following denitions, consider the Henkin model obtained by the
extensional collapse of the closed term applicative structure This is only guaranteed to
exist if there are no term constants with second-order or higher types (again see [14,
p. 421]). The reason is that the equivalence relation on terms is only guaranteed to
agree with =

on base types, so term constants of second-order or higher type might
not respect the equivalence relation. However, if we allow free variables of base type
(zero-order) then the equivalence relation agrees with =

also on rst-order types and
it is possible to have term constants of second-order type. In general, if we have free
variables at type level n then =

agrees with the extensional equivalence at level n+ 1
and the extensional collapse works for signatures containing types of level n+2 or lower.
However, rather than work with type orders (which do not distinguish between distinct
base types) everything can be stated with respect to specic types. We shall work with
three sets of types: a primitive set of \quantier" types classifying the variables that
must be allowed to appear in terms (somewhere in the Kripke structure); a derived
set of \equality" types whose extensional equivalence will be =

; and a derived set of
\context" types containing all the types allowed in the signature.
For any type A, dene the set Args(A) of argument types of A by:
Args() = ;
Args(A! B) = fAg [ Args(B):
The set of quantier types can be any set of types closed under arguments, i.e., for any
quantier type A, the set Args(A) must contain only quantier types. We shall use Q
to range over quantier types. The equality types are now generated by the grammar:
E ::=  j Q! E:
An easy induction on A shows that if Args(A) is contained in the set of quantier types
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then A is an equality type. It follows that every quantier type is an equality type. The
context types are generated by the grammar:
K ::=  j E ! K:
Clearly every equality type is a context type.
Now suppose we have a presentation (T ;P ;;A) such that, for all predicate declar-
ations P : hA
1
; : : : ; A
n
i 2 P , the types A
1
, : : :, A
n
are all equality types and, for all
constant declarations c :A 2 , A is a context type. We shall construct a -structure
from the following ingredients. First, we require a partially ordered set (W;). This will
be the partially ordered set of worlds underlying the eventual -structure. Second, we
require a function Ctxt mapping W to contexts in which the type of every variable is a
context type, such that:
1. w  w
0
implies Ctxt(w)  Ctxt(w
0
), and
2. for all quantier types Q, for all w 2W , there exists w
0
 w such that Ctxt(w
0
) 
Ctxt(w); x :Q for some x not occurring in Ctxt(w).
Dene
([A])
w
= fM j Ctxt(w) 

M :Ag:
Third, we require, for every P : hA
1
; : : : ; A
n
i 2 P , a W -indexed family of relations
([P ])
w
 ([A
1
])
w
 : : : ([A
n
])
w
respecting =

such that w  w
0
implies ([P ])
w
 ([P ])
w
0
(it is clear that condition 1 above implies ([A
i
])
w
 ([A
i
])
w
0).
The elements of [[A]]
w
will be equivalence classes of ([A])
w
under an equivalence relation

A
w
. This is dened inductively on the structure of A by:
M 

w
M
0
i M =

M
0
M 
A!B
w
M
0
i for all w
0
 w, for all N;N
0
2 ([A])
w
0, N 
A
w
0 N
0
implies
M(N) 
B
w
0 M
0
(N
0
).
Symmetry and transitivity are easily shown by induction on types. Reexivity requires
more work. Essentially it follows from the \Basic Lemma" for admissible Kripke logical
relations over Kripke applicative structures with acceptable meaning functions (cf. [14,
Lemma 3.2.5, p. 418]); however, Kripke logical relations have not been treated in such
generality in the literature, so it is worthwhile giving the argument.
First, note that 
A
is monotone: if M 
A
w
M
0
and w  w
0
then M 
A
w
0 M
0
(by an
easy induction on the structure of A).
Lemma 4.7 Suppose M;M
0
2 ([K])
w
(where K is a context type) then M =

M
0
implies M 
K
w
M
0
. Further, if K is an equality type then M 
K
w
M
0
implies M =

M
0
.
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Proof. By induction on the structure of K. For base types the proposition is trivial.
For E ! K
0
suppose that M =

M
0
. Take any w
0
 w and N;N
0
2 ([E])
w
0 such that
N 
E
w
0 N
0
. Then, by the induction hypothesis, N =

N
0
and so M(N) =

M
0
(N
0
).
Thus, again by the induction hypothesis, M(N) 
K
0
w
0 (M
0
)(N
0
). This shows that indeed
M 
E!K
0
w
M
0
.
If K is a non-atomic equality type then it has form Q! E. Suppose that M 
Q!E
w
M
0
. Let w
0
 w be such that Ctxt(w
0
)  Ctxt(w); x :Q (as in requirement 2 above).
Then, by the induction hypothesis, x 
Q
w
0
x so M(x) 
E
w
0 M
0
(x). Again by the induction
hypothesis, M(x) =

M
0
(x). So indeed M =

M
0
. 2
Thus for equality types E, M 
E
w
M
0
if and only if M =

M
0
, hence the reason for their
name.
Lemma 4.8 If M 
A
w
M
0
and M
0
=

M
00
2 ([A])
w
then M 
A
w
M
00
.
Proof. By induction on the structure of A. When A is atomic the proposition is trivial.
If A is B ! C then suppose M 
B!C
w
M
0
and M
0
=

M
00
2 ([B ! C])
w
. Take any
w
0
 w and N;N
0
2 ([B])
w
0 such that N 
B
w
0 N
0
. Then M(N) 
C
w
0 M
0
(N
0
). However,
M
0
(N
0
) =

M
00
(N
0
) 2 ([C])
w
0 . So, by the induction hypothesis, M(N) 
C
w
0 M
00
(N
0
).
Thus indeed M 
B!C
w
M
00
. 2
Corollary 4.9 If M and M
0
both have type B in Ctxt(w); x : A and M [N=x] 
B
w
M
0
[N
0
=x] then (x :A:M)(N)
B
w
(x :A:M
0
)(N
0
).
Proof. Apply Lemma 4.8 twice (using the symmetry of 
B
w
). 2
The next lemma is essentially the \Basic Lemma" of logical relations applied to 
A
w
. We
just outline the well-known argument, as all the interesting groundwork has been done.
Lemma 4.10 If N
1

A
1
N
0
1
, : : :, N
k

A
k
N
0
k
and Ctxt(w); x
1
:A
1
; : : : ; x
k
:A
k


M :A
then M [N
1
; : : : ; N
k
=x
1
; : : : ; x
k
] 
A
w
M [N
0
1
; : : : ; N
0
k
=x
1
; : : : ; x
k
].
Proof. By induction on the structure of M . The case for a variable x
i
(1  i  k)
is trivial. For a variable in Ctxt(w) or a constant in  the proposition follows from
Lemma 4.7 (as its type must be a context type). Applications follow easily from the
denition of 
B!C
w
for function types. Abstractions also follow from this denition
using the monotonicity of 
A
1
, : : :, 
A
k
and Corollary 4.9. 2
The reexivity of 
A
w
is an immediate consequence of this lemma. We write [M ]
w
for
the equivalence class of M 2 ([A])
w
under 
A
w
. Note that it now follows from Lemma 4.8
that, for M;M
0
2 ([A])
w
, M =

M
0
implies M 
A
w
M
0
.
We dene the remaining components of the -structure, (W;), by:
[[A]]
w
= ([A])
w
= 
A
w
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[[P ]]
w
([M
1
]
w
; : : : ; [M
n
]
w
) i ([P ])
w
(M
1
; : : : ;M
n
)
[[c]]
w
= [c]
w

AB
w
([M ]
w
; [N ]
w
) = [M(N)]
w
i
A
ww
0([M ]
w
) = [M ]
w
0
K
AB
w
= [x :A: y :B: x]
w
S
ABC
w
= [x :A! B ! C: y :A! B: z :A: x(z)(y(z))]
w
Proposition 4.11 (W;) is indeed a -structure.
Proof. For P : hA
1
; : : : ; A
n
i, [[P ]]
w
is well-dened because A
1
, : : : , A
n
are all equality
types and so 
A
i
w
is just =

and ([P ])
w
respects =

. That the evaluation maps 
AB
w
are well-dened follows from the denition of 
A!B
w
. The coercions i
A
ww
0 are well-dened
because of the monotonicity of 
A
. The other components are obviously well-dened.
It remains to check the various conditions. Identity, composition and naturality are
all immediate. Extensionality is a straightforward consequence of the denition of
A!B
w
.
Persistency follows from the monotonicity requirement on ([P ])
w
. Lastly, K
AB
and S
ABC
satisfy the required equalities because 
A
w
contains the restriction of =

to terms in
([A])
w
. 2
We conclude the presentation of the -structure (W;) with two basic propositions
relating terms and their interpretations.
Proposition 4.12 If N
1
2 ([A
1
])
w
, : : : , N
k
2 ([A
k
])
w
and x
1
:A
1
; : : : ; x
k
:A
k


M :A
then [[M ]]
[x
1
:=[N
1
];:::;x
k
:=[N
k
]]
w
= [M [N
1
; : : : ; N
k
=x
1
; : : : ; x
k
]]
w
.
Proof. A straightforward induction on the structure of M . 2
Proposition 4.13 If N
1
2 ([A
1
])
w
, : : : , N
k
2 ([A
k
])
w
and  is well-formed in the context
x
1
:A
1
; : : : ; x
k
:A
k
then w j=
[x
1
:=[N
1
];:::;x
k
:=[N
k
]]
 if and only if w j= [N
1
; : : : ; N
k
=x
1
; : : : ; x
k
].
Proof. Immediate from Proposition 4.12 and Lemma 4.5. 2
We now prove of the completeness direction of Theorem 4.6. The result will not
actually be required in the paper. However, the model we use for proving completeness
will be reused in Section 6. The model is one extreme (and simple) case of the term
model construction in Section 4. Let the set of quantier types be the set of all types.
Consider the partial order (W
(;A)
;
(;A)
) dened by:
W
(;A)
= f(?;H) j every formula in H is well-formed in ?g
(?;H) 
(;A)
(?
0
;H
0
) i ?  ?
0
and H  H
0
:
The function Ctxt fromW
(;A)
to context is just the rst projection. This clearly satises
the two conditions above. The interpretation of predicates is:
([P ])
( ;H)
(M
1
; : : : ;M
n
) i ?;H `
(;A)
P (M
1
; : : : ;M
n
):
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This respects =

because of the Sub rule, and is monotonic because of weakening
(Lemma 2.1). We can now construct the -structure (W
(;A)
;
(;A)
) as above. For
simplicity we shall just write [M ] for the equivalence class of a term M at (?;H). Note
that, as every type is an equality type, the equivalence relation is always =

(restricted
to terms well-typed in the appropriate context).
Given a context ? we construct a canonical environment 
 
as follows. If, for some
type A, the declaration x : A is in ? then 
 
(x) is the partial element with domain
f(?
0
;H) j ?
0
 ?g given by 
 
(x)
( 
0
;H)
= [x]. Otherwise, if there is no such A, then 
 
(x)
is the trivial partial element with domain ;. Clearly, for all ?
0
 ?, the environment 
 
interprets ? at (?
0
;H).
The crucial property of (W
(
A
)
;
(;A)
) is:
Lemma 4.14 ?;H `
(;A)
 if and only if (?;H) j=

 
.
Proof. By induction on the structure of . The cases are:
P (M
1
; : : : ;M
n
): Immediate from the denitions of [[P ]]
( ;H)
and ([P ])
( ;H)
.
  	: Suppose that ?;H `
(;A)
  	. Take any ?
0
 ? and H
0
 H such that
(?
0
;H
0
) j=

 
. Then clearly (?
0
;H
0
) j=

 
0
. So, by the induction hypothesis,
?
0
;H
0
`
(;A)
. Therefore ?
0
;H
0
`
(;A)
	. Then, again by the induction hypo-
thesis, (?
0
;H
0
) j=

 
0
	, so (?
0
;H
0
) j=

 
	 (because all the free variables in 	 are in
?). Thus we have shown that (?;H) j=

 
  	 as required.
Conversely, suppose (?;H) j=

 
  	. Now ?;H; `
(;A)
, so, by the induction
hypothesis, (?;H [ fg) j=

 
. Then, by the assumption, (?;H [ fg) j=

 
	.
Whence, by the induction hypothesis, ?;H; `
(;A)
	. Thus indeed ?;H `
(;A)
  	.
8x :A: : Suppose ?;H `
(;A)
8x : A: . Take any ?
0
 ?, H
0
 H and [M ] 2
[[A]]
( 
0
;H
0
)
. Then ?
0


M :A and ?
0
;H
0
`
(;A)
8x :A: , so ?
0
;H
0
`
(;A)
[M=x].
Now, by the induction hypothesis, (?
0
;H
0
) j=

 
0
[M=x]. So, by Proposition 4.13,
(?
0
;H
0
) j=

 
0
[x:=[M ]]
. Now (?
0
;H
0
) j=

 
[x:=[M ]]
, because all the free variables in
 are in ?
0
; x :A. We have therefore shown that (?;H) j=

 
8x :A:  as required.
Conversely, suppose that (?;H) j=

 
8x :A: . Now [x] 2 [[A]]
( [fx:Ag;H)
. Therefore
(? [ fx :Ag;H) j=

 
[x:=[x]]
, and so (? [ fx :Ag;H) j=

 [fx:Ag
 (by the denition
of 
 [fx:Ag
). So, by the induction hypothesis, ?; x : A;H `
(;A)
. Thus indeed
?;H `
(;A)
8x :A: .
2
Corollary 4.15 (W
(;A)
;
(;A)
) is a (;A)-model.
19
Proof. Immediate. 2
Completeness now follows easily. Suppose that statement 2 of Theorem 4.6 holds. Then
in particular (?;H) j=

( ;H)
. So, by Lemma 4.14, ?;H `
(;A)
 as required.
5 Semantic proofs of faithfulness
The semantics presented above provides the tool for proving the faithfulness properties
deferred from Section 3. The proofs all have a common avour. In each case we dene a
-structure (or family of -structures) and show that it is indeed a model of the relevant
encoding. The faithfulness of the encoding will then follow almost immediately from the
denition of the model and the soundness direction of Theorem 4.6. A more uniform
analysis of the requirements on the model will be given in Section 6.
We begin with the encoding, (T
m
;P
m
;
m
;A
m
), of minimal implicational logic given
in Figure 3. DeneW
m
to be the set of all nite sets of formulae of minimal implicational
logic. We use  to range over W
m
. We shall dene a 
m
-structure over the discrete
partial order (W
m
;=). This will be a term model of the sort constructed in Section
4. The set of quantier types is just the empty set (which is trivially closed under
arguments). Clearly the only argument type to a predicate, o, is an equality type and it
is easily checked that every type in 
m
is contained in the derived set of context types.
The context function, Ctxt
m
, maps every element of W
m
to the empty set. This clearly
satises the two required properties. Thus the set ([A])

is just the set of closed terms
of type A. The only predicate, true, is interpreted by:
([true])

(M) i  `
m
(M)
where we are making use of the equivalence between long- normal forms of type o and
formulae. Again this satises the required properties: it respects =

by denition, and
monotonicity is a vacuous requirement over the discrete partial order. These ingredients
are all we need to dene the 
m
-structure (W
m
;=) as in Section 4.
In Section 1 we claimed that we would build models of the framework out of the syntax
of the encoded logic. Although (W
m
;=) is built from terms of the framework, the crucial
property is that we have only used closed terms, so [[o]]

is the set of equivalence classes of
closed terms of type o under =

. Therefore [[o]]

is in one-to-one correspondence with
the set of formulae of minimal implicational logic (by taking -normal forms as the
representatives of their equivalence classes). This correspondence enables us to interpret
framework predicates over type o as expressing (intuitionistic) properties of formulae of
minimal implicational logic. To make this explicit, and for notational convenience, we
henceforth identify [[o]]

with the set of formulae.
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Proposition 5.1 (W
m
;=) is a (
m
;A
m
)-model.
Proof. We must show that (W
m
;=) validates the three axioms in A
m
. Consider, for
example, the third axiom:
8p :o: 8q :o: true(p) q)  true(p)  true(q)
Suppose we have a world  and an environment  with (p)

= , (q)

=  , such
that  j=

true(p) q) and  j=

true(p). Then, by Proposition 4.13,  j= true()  )
and  j= true(). So, by the denition of ([true])

,  `
m
 )  and  `
m
, whence,
by modus ponens (for minimal logic),  `
m
 . Thus  j= true( ) and so, again by
Proposition 4.13,  j=

true(q). It follows that (W
m
;=) does indeed validate the third
axiom. The other two axioms are easier. 2
Note how the proof follows the informal justication of the correctness of the axioms in
A
m
.
It is now a simple step to prove the faithfulness direction of Proposition 3.1. Sup-
pose that true(
1
); : : : ; true(
n
) `
(
m
;A
m
)
true(). Consider the world  = f
1
; : : : ; 
n
g
in W
m
. Then clearly  j= true(
1
) and : : : and  j= true(
n
). So, by the sound-
ness direction of Theorem 4.6,  j= true(). But then, by the denition of ([true])

,

1
; : : : ; 
n
`
m
 as required.
It is interesting to investigate the interpretation of formulae of the framework induced
by the model (W
m
;=). Because the partial order is discrete, the model validates any
instance of Peirce's law, i.e., for any framework sentences  and 	,
(W
m
;=) j= ((  	)  )  ;
so meta-implication is given a classical interpretation. Therefore, the schema for Peirce's
law could be added to A
m
without losing adequacy.
A more interesting axiom that one might like to add to A
m
is:
8p :o: 8q :o: (true(p)  true(q))  true(p) q): (1)
Intuitively, this expresses the true fact that the Deduction Theorem holds for `
m
. Adding
(1) to the encoding would enable derivations in the natural deduction system for minimal
logic to be mimicked easily in the framework. However, (W
m
;=) does not validate (1).
Consider the world ; and interpret p by a
0
and q by a
1
. Then it is the case that
; j= true(a
0
)  true(a
1
), because the meta-implication is interpreted classically and
6`
m
a
0
, but it is not the case that ; j= true(a
0
) a
1
), because 6`
m
a
0
) a
1
. The problem
is that, because of its classical implication, (W
m
;=) does not interpret (1) as expressing
the Deduction Theorem (see the discussion in Section 1). In fact, the reading of (1)
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as expressing the Deduction Theorem for minimal logic is inconsistent with a classical
meta-implication: if Peirce's law and (1) are added together to A
m
then the resulting
encoding is not adequate (it is easy to derive true(((a
0
) a
1
)) a
0
)) a
0
)).
However, if just (1) alone is added to A
m
then adequacy is retained. To show this
we need a 
m
-structure in which meta-implication is interpreted intuitionistically. The
modication required is very slight. We take the term model dened over (W
m
;)
generated by the same (empty) set of quantier types, Ctxt
m
and ([true])

(it is easily
checked that the required properties hold). The proof of Proposition 5.1 applies mutatis
mutandis to (W
m
;) so this is indeed a (
m
;A
m
)-model.
Proposition 5.2 (W
m
;) j= 8p :o: 8q :o: (true(p)  true(q))  true(p) q).
Proof. Suppose we have a world  and an environment  with (p)

= , (q)

=  ,
such that  j=

(true(p)  true(q)). Then, by Proposition 4.13,  j= true()  true( ).
However  [ fg   is a world such that  [ fg j= true(). So  [ fg j= true( ).
But then ;  `
m
 (by the denition of ([true])
[fg
). So  `
m
 )  , by the
Deduction Theorem for `
m
. Therefore  j= true()  ). So, again by Proposition 4.13,
 j=

true(p) q) as required. 2
Note that once again the proof follows the intuitive explanation of the correctness of
(1) using the Deduction Theorem. Further, the non-triviality of the partial order was
essential to the proof. The faithfulness of the encoding now follows by the same argument
as before.
We now turn to the encoding, (T
T
;P
T
;
T
;A
T
), of a rst-order theory T given in
Figure 4. This time we have axiom (1) built into the encoding. However, this time
it is not inconsistent with a classical meta-implication, because the implication of the
encoded logic is also classical. This fact enables a very simple proof of faithfulness based
on interpretations in the classical full type hierarchy.
Let M = (D; fP
A
i
i
g; ff
a
i
i
g) be any rst-order model of T . We shall construct a 
T
model, (fw
M
g;=), over the trivial partial order. Thus essentially we shall be working
with a standard Henkin model [14, x2.4]. None of the extra generality of Kripke lambda
models will be required. However, we shall see later that the present construction has
its limitations.
Types are interpreted by (as there is only one world we omit the subscript):
[[]] = D
[[o]] = ftt; g
[[A! B]] = [[B]]
[A]
where [[B]]
[A]
is the full set-theoretic function space. The predicate is interpreted by:
[[true]](b) i b = tt:
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The constants are interpreted, following the semantics of rst-order logic, by:
[[)]](b
1
)(b
2
) =
8
<
:
tt if b
1
=  or b
2
= tt
 otherwise
[[:]](b) =
8
<
:
tt if b = 
 if b = tt
[[8]](f) =
8
<
:
tt if, for all d 2 D, f(d) = tt
 otherwise
[[=]](d
1
)(d
2
) =
8
<
:
tt if d
1
= d
2
 otherwise
[[P
a
i
i
]](d
1
) : : :(d
a
i
) =
8
<
:
tt if P
a
i
i
(d
1
; : : : ; d
a
i
)
 otherwise
[[f
a
0
i
i
]](d
1
) : : :(d
a
0
i
) = f(d
1
; : : : ; d
a
0
i
):
The components 
AB
, K
AB
and S
ABC
are given their standard interpretations in the full
type hierarchy [14, p. 384]. (The coercions i
A
w
M
w
M
are of course trivial.)
Let X be a nite set of rst-order variables. Let  be any function from X to D.
If t is a rst-order term with all free variables in X then we write t

M
for its induced
interpretation in M. Clearly  as dened is an environment interpreting X :  (at w
M
)
in (fw
M
g;=). By the correspondence between framework terms and rst-order terms, t
is also a term of type  in long- form with respect to X : .
Lemma 5.3 t

M
= [[t]]

.
Proof. An easy induction on the structure of t. 2
Now let  be any rst-order formulae with all free variables in X . The satisfaction of the
rst-order formula  by M is related to the interpretation of the term  in (fw
M
g;=)
by:
Lemma 5.4 M j=

 if and only if [[]]

= tt.
Proof. A straightforward induction on the structure of  using Lemma 5.3 for atomic
formulae. 2
Proposition 5.5 (fw
M
g;=) is a (
T
;A
T
)-model.
Proof. We must show that (fw
M
g;=) validates the 8+ l axioms in A
T
. For the axioms
true(T
1
); : : : ; true(T
l
), this is immediate by Lemma 5.4. We consider two interesting cases
from the other eight axioms.
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1. 8p :o: 8q :o: (true(p)  true(q))  true(p) q).
Suppose we an environment  with (p) = b and (q) = b
0
such that w
M
j=

true(p)  true(q). Then either b =  or b
0
= tt. So [[p ) q]]

= tt. Therefore
w
M
j=

true(p) q) as required.
2. 8p : ! o: (8x : : true(p(x)))  true(8x: p(x)).
Suppose we have an environment  with (p) = f such thatw
M
j=

8x : : true(p(x)).
Then given any d 2 [[]], we have that w
M
j=
[x:=d]
true(p(x)), so f(d) = tt. But
then [[8x p(x)]]

= [[8]](f) = tt. Thus indeed w
M
j=

true(8x: p(x)).
2
We can now establish the faithfulness direction of Proposition 3.2. Suppose then that
X : ; true(
1
); : : : ; true(
n
) `
(
T
;A
T
)
true(). LetM be any model of T and let  be any
rst-order environment such thatM j=


1
and : : : andM j=


n
. Then, by Lemma 5.4,
w
M
j=

true(
1
) and : : : and w
M
j=

true(
n
) (in the model (fw
M
g;=)). So, by the
soundness direction of Theorem 4.6, w
M
j=

true(). But then, again by Lemma 5.4,
M j=

. Therefore, by the semantic characterization of `
T
, we have established that
indeed 
1
; : : : ; 
n
`
T
.
Although we restricted attention to a nite rst-order signature and a nite set of
axioms, nothing in the argument has relied upon this fact. However, the given argument
only extends to innite rst-order signatures and axiom sets by taking the evident innite
presentation of the theory. Often, however, one has an innite axiomatization by way of
a nite number of axiom schemas. In such cases one would like to encode the logic by a
nite presentation.
A case in point is Peano Arithmetic. This has no nite rst-order axiomatization
but it can be given a nite presentation in the framework. The presentation, which
we call (
A
;A
A
), is just the presentation for the rst-order theory (in the language of
arithmetic) given by Peano's six axioms, augmented with the framework axiom:
8p : ! o: true(p(0)) (8x: p(x)) p(s(x)))) 8x: p(x)) (2)
expressing the induction schema. A similar encoding of arithmetic (in the context of LF)
was proved faithful by Harper et al [9]. If the 
A
-structures (fw
M
g;=) (constructed as
above where M is a model of Peano Arithmetic) were (
A
;A
A
)-models then we should
have a simple semantic proof of faithfulness. Unfortunately, in general they are not! To
see this, consider any model M of Peano Arithmetic such that
w
M
j= 8p : ! o: true(p(0)) (8x: p(x)) p(s(x)))) 8x: p(x)):
Then, for all f 2 [[! o]], [[true(p(0)) (8x: p(x)) p(s(x)))) 8x:p(x))]]
[p:=f ]
= tt. But
this says that M satises the full second-order induction axiom, which means that M
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must be isomorphic to the standard model of arithmetic. Therefore the above argument
for faithfulness does not go through.
The example illustrates nicely the limitations of building a model of the framework
out of a model of the encoded logic. In the rst-order models the variable p ranges over
all subsets of the domain, whereas the desired semantic reading of (2) is for p to range
only over the arithmetically denable subsets. It may be possible to patch the model
construction by considering only a subset of all functions at higher type, as in Henkin's
general models of higher order logic [10]. However, we have no denite ideas about how
to do this and the details would almost certainly be complicated.
In order to give a proof of the faithfulness of the encoding, we resort instead to a
term model construction. This time the set of quantier types is necessarily non-empty,
for otherwise the type of 8 would not be a context type. In fact we can take the set of
quantier types to be just fg. The model will be constructed over of the partial order
(W
A
;
A
) where:
W
A
= f(X;) j X is a nite set of variables and  is a
nite set of formulae with all free variables in Xg
(X;) 
A
(X
0
;
0
) i X  X
0
and   
0
.
The context function, Ctxt
A
, maps (X; ) to X : . This clearly satises the two proper-
ties. demanded of it. The predicate, true, is interpreted by:
([true])
(X;)
(M) i  `
A
(M)
where M is a term of type o in the context X : , so (M) is indeed (according to our
correspondence) a formula (with all free variables in X). We now dene the 
A
-structure
(W
A
;
A
) as is Section 4.
Once more, the restriction to terms typed in contexts of the form X :  means that
the sets [[]]
(X;)
and [[o]]
(X;)
correspond to sets of terms and formulae of the encoded
logic. Again we take the notational liberty of working with [[]]
(X;)
and [[o]]
(X;)
as if
they were respectively the set of arithmetic terms with variables in X and the set of
arithmetic formula with free variables in X . Similarly, because ! o is an equality type,
we can work with [[ ! o]]
(X;)
as if it were the set of terms of type  ! o in long-
normal form with respect to X : .
Proposition 5.6 (W
A
;
A
) is a (
A
;A
A
)-model.
Proof. We must show that (W
A
;
A
) validates all the axioms in A. For (1) this is
shown as in the proof of Proposition 5.2. We consider just two of the other axioms:
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1. 8p : ! o: (8x : : true(p(x)))  true(8x: p(x)).
Suppose we have a world (X;) and an environment  with (p)
(X;)
= x :
:  such that (X;) j=

8x : : true(p(x)). Then (X;) j= 8x : : true(), by
Proposition 4.13. Let x be any variable not in X . Then x 2 [[]]
(X[fxg;)
and so (X[
fxg;) j=
[x:=x]
true(). Therefore (X [ fxg;) j= true(), by Proposition 4.13.
So  `
A
 where x does not appear free in . But then, by the 8-introduction
rule of natural deduction,  `
A
8x: . So (X;) j= true(8x: ). Thus, again by
Proposition 4.13, (X;) j=

true(8x: p(x)) as required.
2. 8p : ! o: true(p(0)) (8x: p(x)) p(s(x)))) 8x: p(x)).
Suppose we have a world (X;) and an environment  with (p)
(X;)
= x :
: . Now, by the induction schema,  `
A
[0=x] ) (8x:  ) [s(x)=x]) )
8x: . So (X;) j= true([0=x] ) (8x:  ) [s(x)=x])) 8x: ). But then, by
Proposition 4.13, (X;) j=

true(p(0) ) (8x: p(x) ) p(s(x))) ) 8x: p(x)) as
required.
2
Note that this time the partial order is important. The formula set component of the
partial order is required to validate (1) (as in the proof of Proposition 5.2), and the
variable set component is required for \8-introduction".
For faithfulness, suppose that X : ; true(
1
); : : : ; true(
n
) `
A
true() where all the
free variables in the formulae are contained in X . Consider the world (X;) where
 = f
1
; : : : ; 
n
g. Let  be any environment mapping each x in X :  to (the partial
element generated by) x (at (X;)). Then clearly (X;) j=

true(
1
) and : : : and
(X;) j=

true(
n
). Therefore (X;) j=

true(). So indeed  `
A
.
Clearly the above argument applies equally well in the general case of an arbitrary
rst-order theory axiomatized by a nite number of axiom schemas. So the general
proof of faithfulness we gave using models constructed out of rst-order models can be
bettered by using term models. What then is the point of considering the original more
semantic models? One reason for considering such models is to give, when possible, a
truly semantic interpretation of the encoding. Further, such models are rather simpler
than the term models. A more pragmatic reason for considering them is aorded by
encodings, such as our presentation of the modal logic K in Figure 5, based directly on
the semantics of the encoded logic. In the case of this encoding it is not clear how a proof
using term models would proceed (as the encoding is not based on any proof system).
However, it is quite straightforward to give a proof of faithfulness based on models of
the framework built out of Kripke models of modal logic.
Given a Kripke model, M = (W;R; j=), we construct once more a model (fw
M
g;=)
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in the full type hierarchy. The base types are interpreted by:
[[N ]] = N
[[o]] = }(W )
[[W ]] = W
where N is the set of natural numbers. (Function types are again interpreted by the full
function space.) The predicates are interpreted by:
[[R]](w; v) i wRv
[[sat]](w; V ) i w 2 V
The constants are interpreted by:
[[0]] = 0
[[s]](n) = n+ 1
[[a]](n) = fw j w j= a
n
g
[[)]](V )(V
0
) = (WnV )[ V
0
[[:]](V ) = WnV
[[2]](V ) = fw j for all v 2 W , wRv implies v 2 V g
The denitions above follow the standard interpretation of modal formulae in the Boolean
algebra (}(W );) induced by the Kripke model M.
Lemma 5.7 w j=  if and only if w 2 [[]].
Proof. By a straightforward induction on the structure of . 2
Proposition 5.8 (fw
M
g;) is a (
K
;A
K
)-model.
Proof. We must show that (fw
M
g;) validates the six axioms. We just consider
one case: 8x :W: 8p :o: (8y :W: R(x; y)  sat(y; p))  sat(x;2p). Suppose we have an
environment  with (x) = w and (p) = V such that w
M
j=

8y :W: R(x; y)  sat(y; p).
Then, for all v 2 W , wRv implies v 2 V . Thus w 2 [[2]](V ). So w
M
j=

sat(x;2p) as
required. 2
To establish faithfulness, suppose that x :W ; sat(x; 
1
); : : : ; sat(x; 
n
) `
(
K
;A
K
)
sat(x; ).
Now take any Kripke model M = (W;R; j=) and any w 2 W such that w j= 
1
and
: : : and w j= 
n
. Then, by Lemma 5.7, w
M
j=
[x:=w]
sat(x; 
1
) and : : : and w
M
j=
[x:=w]
sat(x; 
n
) (in the model (fw
M
g;=)). So, by the soundness direction of Theorem 4.6,
w
M
j=
[x:=w]
sat(x; ). Whence, again by Lemma 5.7, w j= . This shows that indeed

1
; : : : ; 
n
`
K
 (by the semantic characterization of `
K
).
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6 Towards a general theory
In this section we consider more abstractly the theory underlying the above applications.
We give a general denition of what it means to encode a logic in the framework. This
enables us to give semantic characterizations of the properties of fullness and faithfulness.
We then discuss how well the general theory applies to the examples we have considered.
In order to give a general denition of encoding, we need rst a general notion of
logic. We consider a logic abstractly as a consequence relation. A consequence relation,
`, over a set L (of sentences) is a binary relation between nite subsets of L and L
satisfying the following three conditions.
reexivity:  ` .
weakening: If 
1
; : : : ; 
n
`  then 
1
; : : : ; 
n
;  ` .
transitivity: If 
1
; : : : ; 
n
`  and 
1
; : : : ; 
n
;  `  then 
1
; : : : ; 
n
`  .
A consequence relation, `, determines a closure operator, Th : }(L)! }(L) by:
Th() = f j there exist 
1
; : : : ; 
n
2  such that 
1
; : : : ; 
n
` g
where, in contrast to earlier, we use  to range over arbitrary subsets of L. Further, Th
is continuous (it preserves directed unions). In fact consequence relations are in one-to-
one correspondence with continuous closure operators. We call those sets in the image
of the closure operator theories and we write Theories for the set of all theories. Note
that L itself is a theory. (Thus we are not requiring all theories to be \consistent".)
The denition of consequence relation (in the form of continuous closure operator)
goes back to Tarski [22]. For discussion on the appropriateness of the notion of con-
sequence relation as an abstract notion of logic see Scott [21], Avron [2] and Ryan and
Sadler [20].
The denition of consequence relation using only nite sets in the antecedent amounts
to an assumption of compactness. Many model-theoretic logics have non-compact con-
sequence relations. To treat these one must consider relations between }(L) and L. The
correct axioms require innitary forms of weakening and transitivity giving relations cor-
responding to arbitrary closure operators on }(L). However, for our purposes compact
consequence relations suce, for it is impossible to adequately encode a non-compact
consequence relation in the framework (because of the compactness of the logic of the
framework).
An encoding of a consequence relation ` over L is given by a presentation (T ;P ;;A)
containing the following ingredients:
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1. A distinguished type constant o in T together with a function:
()

: L ! fM j

M :o, M is in long- normal formg
mapping formulae of the object-logic to their representing terms in the framework.
2. A distinguished predicate, true, with declaration true :hoi 2 P .
One might prefer to ask that ()

be injective or even bijective, however such requirements
make no dierence to the theory. The encoding is said to be full if

1
; : : : ; 
n
`  implies true(

1
); : : : ; true(

n
) `
(;A)
true(

);
it is said to be faithful if
true(

1
); : : : ; true(

n
) `
(;A)
true(

) implies 
1
; : : : ; 
n
` :
An encoding that is both full and faithful is said to be adequate.
At this point it is worth considering how well our earlier examples t into the general
scheme. Only the encoding of minimal implicational logic requires no change. The
encoding of the modal logic K has no true predicate. However, it is easy to massage the
encoding into the scheme. One way of doing so is to include the true predicate together
with a new constant w
0
:W in 
K
and extend the axioms with:
8p :o: sat(w
0
; p) true(p)
8p :o: true(p)  sat(w
0
; p)
Semantically, this amounts to considering consequence over pointed Kripke models. For
the encoding of rst-order logic, the problem is that the consequence relation we consider
is between open formulae, whereas in our general denition of encoding we consider only
closed terms in the framework. An obvious way of tting rst-order logic into the general
scheme is to consider instead the consequence relation over sentences. However, it would
be more interesting to generalize the notions of consequence relation and encoding to
cater explicitly for free variables and substitution. One proposal along these lines has
been recently suggested by Gardner [7]. However, for simplicity, we work with the less
complicated \propositional" notion of consequence relation.
There are other changes that one might make to the notion of encoding. Gardner
gives a general denition of encoding adopting fullness as one of the requirements [8].
However, we prefer to keep the denition of encoding as general as possible considering
the two halves of adequacy as extra conditions (which in practice an encoding must
satisfy). This approach allows us to analyse semantic properties corresponding to the
fullness and faithfulness of an encoding. It must be said that neither one of fullness and
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faithfulness is particularly interesting without the other. A trivial full encoding is always
given by the axiom 8p : o: true(p). A trivial faithful encoding is given by an empty A.
Further, some faithful encodings do not extend to adequate encodings. For an example
consider the encoding of minimal implicational logic obtained by replacing the entire
set A
m
with f8p : o: true(p) p)  true(p)g (the faithfulness of this is an easy semantic
exercise).
The two halves of adequacy each correspond to conditions on the class of (;A)-
models. Given a (;A)-model, (W;), dene form :W ! }(L) by:
form(w) = f j w j= true(

)g
We write form(W ) for the set fform(w) j w 2Wg.
Theorem 6.1 (Semantic characterization of fullness) The following are equival-
ent:
1. The encoding is full.
2. For all (;A)-models (W;), form(W )  Theories.
Proof. Suppose the encoding is full. Let (W;) be any (;A)-model, and take any
w 2 W . We must show that form(w) 2 Theories. Suppose that 
1
; : : : ; 
n
`  for some

1
; : : : ; 
n
2 form(w). By fullness, true(

1
); : : : ; true(

n
) `
(;A)
true(

). But, by the
denition of form(w), w j= true(

1
) and : : : and w j= true(

n
). So, by the soundness of
the meta-logic, w j= true(

). But then  2 form(w). Thus form(w) = Th(form(w)). So
indeed form(w) 2 Theories.
Conversely, suppose that, for all (;A)-models (W;), form(W )  Theories. Sup-
pose further that 
1
; : : : ; 
n
` . We must show that true(

1
); : : : ; true(

n
) `
(;A)
true(

). For this we use the model, (W
(;A)
;
(;A)
), used in the proof of completeness
in Section 4. By Corollary 4.15, we know this is indeed a (;A)-model. Consider the
world w = (;; ftrue(

1
); : : : ; true(

n
)g). By the initial supposition, form(w) 2 Theories.
But clearly f
1
; : : : ; 
n
g  form(w), so  2 form(w) (as any theory is closed un-
der consequence). Therefore w j= true(

). So, by the denition of (W
(;A)
;
(;A)
),
true(

1
); : : : ; true(

n
) `
(;A)
true(

) as required. 2
Theorem 6.2 (Semantic characterization of faithfulness) The following are equi-
valent:
1. The encoding is faithful.
2. There exists a (;A)-model, (W;), such that Theories  form(W ).
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Proof. Suppose the encoding is faithful. We will show that the (;A)-model
(W
(;A)
;
(;A)
) has the required property. Take any T 2 Theories. We must show
that there exists (?;H) 2W
(;A)
with form((?;H)) = T . For this we take the world w =
(;; ftrue( 

) j  2 Tg). Clearly (from the denition of (W
(;A)
;
(;A)
)) T  form(w).
We now show that form(w)  T . Suppose that  2 form(w). Then w j= true(

), so
ftrue( 

) j  2 Tg `
(;A)
true(

). By the (evident) compactness of `
(;A)
, there exist

1
; : : : ; 
n
2 T such that true(

1
); : : : ; true(

n
) `
(;A)
true(

). Therefore, by faithful-
ness, 
1
; : : : ; 
n
` . Thus indeed  2 T (as T is closed under consequence).
Conversely, suppose that there exists a (;A)-model, (W;), such that Theories 
form(W ). Suppose further that true(

1
); : : : ; true(

n
) `
(;A)
true(

). We must show
that 
1
; : : : ; 
n
` . Let w 2 W be such that form(w) = Th(f
1
; : : : ; 
n
g) (such a w
is guaranteed to exist by the assumed property of (W;)). Clearly w j= true(

1
) and
: : : and w j= true(

n
). So, by soundness, w j= true(

). But then  2 form(w) so
 2 Th(f
1
; : : : ; 
n
g). Thus 
1
; : : : ; 
n
`  as required. 2
Although pleasing, the theorem characterizing fullness is not particularly useful. As
we have seen, fullness is easily established proof theoretically. The universal quantic-
ation over models prevents Theorem 6.1 from being a viable alternative. On the other
hand, Theorem 6.2 is intended to be useful. In order to establish faithfulness it is enough
to construct a (;A)-model with the required property.
Unfortunately, none of the earlier proofs of faithfulness are applications of The-
orem 6.2 to the letter. There are two possible remedies. One is to modify the models used
to prove faithfulness. The other is to modify Theorem 6.2. In fact a simple modication
suggests itself from the proof. Call a theory, T , nitely generated if there exist 
1
; : : : ; 
n
such that T = Th(f
1
; : : : ; 
n
g). Then it is clear that an encoding is faithful if and only
if there exists a (;A)-model, (W;), such that form(W ) contains all nitely generated
theories. Both the models (W
m
;=) and (W
m
;) used in the proof of faithfulness for
minimal implicational logic satisfy this modied condition. So those proofs can be seen
as applications of (the modied) Theorem 6.2. However, we stated Theorem 6.2 in its
form above to emphasize the duality with Theorem 6.1. Also, it is trivial to modify the
denition of W
m
(allowing arbitrary sets of formulae) so that Theorem 6.2 applies as
stated. A similar situation occurs with the term model we used to prove the faithfulness
of the encoding of Peano Arithmetic.
The other proofs of faithfulness (using the structures built frommodels of the encoded
logic) are further from Theorem 6.2. To accommodate these we can adapt the theorem
as follows:
Proposition 6.3 The following are equivalent:
1. The encoding is faithful.
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2. There exists a family F  Theories such that every nitely generated theory can
be obtained as
T
F
0
for some F
0
 F and, for every T 2 F , there exists a (;A)-
model, (W;), and a world, w 2 W , such that form(w) = T .
Proof. That 1 implies 2 is immediate from Theorem 6.2 (taking F = Theories). For the
converse, suppose that statement 2 holds and that true(

1
); : : : ; true(

n
) `
(;A)
true(

).
Take some F
0
 F such that
T
F
0
= Th(f
1
; : : : ; 
n
g). Now, for each T 2 F
0
, there
exists a model, (W;), and a world, w, such that form(w) = T . Then, as in the proof
of Theorem 6.2,  2 T . So  2
T
F
0
. Therefore 
1
; : : : ; 
n
`  as required. 2
The proposition is more general than Theorem 6.2, but also less natural.
It is perhaps more interesting to consider again how Theorem 6.2 can be applied as
stated. For example, consider the proof of faithfulness for the encoding of the rst-order
theory T using 
T
-structures of the form (fMg;=). These dierent 
T
-structures can
be gathered together in one all encompassing 
T
-structure as follows. First (to avoid the
size problem) we consider only those rst-order models of T whose domain is contained
in some xed innite set (the Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem guarantees that we can do
so). Let I be the set of such models. We can dene a 
T
-structure over the partial
order (}(I);) by taking the interpretations of types at a world J  I to be the J-
indexed product of the interpretations in the various M2 J . Predicates, constants and
combinators are interpreted pointwise. The coercions, i
A
JJ
0 are the evident projections.
We do not go into further details of the construction. However, Theorem 6.2 holds
as stated because, for any rst-order theory T
0
 T , we have that T
0
= form(fM j
M is a model of T
0
g).
7 Conclusions and related work
In this paper we presented a semantics for a logical framework using the Kripke lambda
models of Mitchell and Moggi. Our main use of the semantics was to give easy faithfulness
proofs for encodings of logics in the framework. Then we gave the beginnings of a general
theory relating properties of encodings to their semantics.
It is worth comparing our use of Kripke lambda models with their use by Mitchell
and Moggi in [15]. In both cases the ro^le of the partial order is to model intuitionistic
entailment. But there are dierences in emphasis due to the dierent logical languages
considered. In [15], although it is remarked that the models interpret full intuitionistic
predicate logic with quantication over all higher types, only the interpretation of equa-
tions is given explicitly. This is because their interest is in obtaining a completeness
theorem for the usual equational consequence relation of the typed lambda-calculus once
empty types are permitted. In this paper we too are not making full use of the scope
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of the models. We consider only a fragment of the full intuitionistic logic, and we have
no equality predicate in the logic. The absence of equality means that the denition of
model could be simplied in various ways. For example, it would be possible to insist
that the coercions, i
A
ww
0 , are injections. However, such restrictions are unnatural. Fur-
thermore, we prefer to keep the denition of model in its full generality to allow the logic
to be extended with equality (and also the other connectives) if desired.
Because of the complexity of Kripke lambda models, the reader might doubt that
our proofs of faithfulness are easier than the usual syntactic ones. We believe that
the proofs using the models constructed over the full type hierarchy are self-evidently
simple. (Also, in the case of our encoding of K, we have argued that a syntactic proof of
faithfulness would be quite involved.) However, the term model constructions certainly
are complex. Nevertheless, we were able to give the general construction just once (in
Section 4). Given this, the applications of the construction in Section 5 were quite
straightforward. Irrespective of the question of simplicity there are two other reasons for
preferring semantic proofs of faithfulness. One is that the same model can be reused to
prove the faithfulness of dierent encodings of the same logic (as in, e.g. the minimal logic
examples involving Pierce's Law and the Deduction Theorem in Section 5). The other
is the fact, mentioned in Section 1, that the models of the encodings give a meta-logical
interpretation to formulae of the framework.
If one is primarily interested in term models, it is possible to work with a consider-
ably simpler notion of Kripke lambda model. Miller has given a semantics for a logic
programming language (very similar to our framework) in terms of Kripke models built
directly out of contexts (for the partial order) and terms [13]. Miller's models are simpler
for two reasons. First, due to their concrete nature, the models provide the application,
coercion and combinator components for free. Second, Miller does not require the models
to be extensional. The term models we consider can be reformulated as Miller models
without having to go through all the rigmarole of extensional collapse.
Nonetheless, there are reasons for preferring extensional models. For one, they are
more \semantic": extensional models give a unique interpretation to terms as (intuition-
istic) functions. Also, if one were to extend the framework with an equality predicate,
extensionality would be required to validate -conversion. Technically, even without
equality, we believe that the extensional collapse technique is interesting enough to make
the consideration of extensional models worthwhile.
One disappointing fact about our proofs of faithfulness in Section 5 is that we never
needed a model that was both genuinely semantic and genuinely intuitionistic. Our \se-
mantic" models were standard classical models of type theory, and our \intuitionistic"
models (i.e. ones over non-trivial partial orders) were term models. It would be interest-
ing to nd a use for a proper hybrid model (perhaps by giving a truly semantic model
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to an encoding of a non-classical logic).
As to future work, there are several interesting lines of development. One is to gen-
eralize the theory of Section 6 to more interesting notions of logic (e.g. the consequence
relations introduced by Gardner [7]). Another is to analyse notions of derived and ad-
missible rule and see whether the semantics of an encoding has anything to say about
how well these are represented by the encoding. It would also be interesting to develop
a notion of Kripke model for the more intricate dependent type theory of LF.
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